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Abstract. This study draws on upper echelons theory, the resource based view, and Pen-
rose’s theory of firm growth to show that slack resources, specifically financial and human 
slack, are essential to the research and development (R&D) strategies of organizations. 
We also suggest that both Chief Executive Officer (CEO) tenure and CEO compensation 
positively moderate the slack-innovation relationship. 
The empirical design compromised of panel regression analysis. We tested our hypotheses 
using all US publicly traded firms between 1993 and 2011.
The research results show that firms with excess financial resources are more likely to 
have higher R&D investments, and to completely understand this relationship we must 
study CEO tenure and compensation.
This study sheds light on central antecedents of firm innovation, it further extends our 
understanding by investigating the impact of CEO tenure and compensation on the slack-
innovation relationship, and it applies a longitudinal design which answers previous calls 
to investigate this topic in more depth by offering enhanced stability to the results while 
allowing for different economic scenarios. 
Keywords: financial slack, human slack, CEO tenure, CEO compensation, firm innova-
tion intensity, R&D investments.
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Introduction
This study enhances our understanding of the impact of organizational resources on 
firm innovation. The importance of resources in firm innovation cannot be emphasized 
enough. Many scholars, building on Penrose’s (1959) work, have argued that resources, 
and the capability to effectively mobilize them, are essential to organizational innova-
370
tion (Levinthal, March 1981). A better understanding of the nature of the resources 
needed to support innovation is therefore essential. This is particularly true given that 
innovation is the driving force behind economic development (Schumpeter 1934) and 
essential to any firm dreaming of a place in the competitive world of the future (Van 
de Ven 1986). This study, therefore, aims to inform the literature on exactly how slack 
resources influence the organizational commitment to innovation. 
The impact of organizational slack on firm outcomes has been perceived as both a 
positive and a negative. On one hand, slack has been perceived as essential to vari-
ous organizational outcomes. Cyert and March (1963) provided the seminal answer to 
this puzzle when they argued that for organizations to survive, and for their political 
coalitions and subgroups to meet competing goals, slack must exist. Later research-
ers built on this work, suggesting that slack prevents unhealthy conflict (Bourgeois, 
Singh 1983) and creates buffers that reduce information-processing and coordination 
costs across subunits (Galbraith 1973). More recently, scholars have argued that slack 
supports innovation (Singh 1986), firm expansion (Bamford et al. 2000), young firm 
IPO valuation (Mousa, Reed 2013), and growth (Bradley et al. 2011). Some research-
ers, however, have countered that slack is an indication of waste. For instance, excess 
resources may decrease efficiency, resulting in performance below the full potential of 
the available resources (Williamson 1963). These scholars argue that slack may interrupt 
the entrepreneurial process (Mosakowski 2002) and negatively impact entrepreneurial 
management (Bradley et al. 2011). 
In this study, we specifically focus on two types of organizational slack: financial and 
human slack. Building on the literature in the two broad categories of financial and hu-
man slack (e.g., Cooper et al. 1994; Mishina et al. 2004), we argue that slack is crucial 
to facilitating and sustaining innovation in organizations and suggest that such resources 
not only impact growth (Mishina et al. 2004), but also directly impact firm innovation. 
We further argue that CEO tenure and compensation, combined with slack resources, 
impact R&D spending. The research and development (R&D) process generally requires 
ample time and resources, and entails some risk. Both financial and human resources are 
particularly necessary throughout the R&D process. For instance, not only do financial 
resources aid the R&D process from an operational point of view, they are essential to 
the acquisition of equipment, technology, new research labs, and the hiring of scientists.
1. Theoretical foundations and hypothesis development
1.1. Financial slack, human slack, and R&D investments
Financial slack refers to the level of assets available to an organization (e.g., cash on 
hand) (Kraatz, Zajac 2001) that can be easily deployed to various uses (Mishina et al. 
2004). Financial slack is the least absorbed form of slack, especially given that it is 
completely divisible for the allocation of multiple activities (Greve 2003). 
From a resource based view (RBV), financial assets are valuable, but not rare, because 
they are generic (Latham, Braun 2008). Even though managers have considerable dis-
cretion in resource allocation, they have to be very careful to make good decisions and 
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avoid misusing finite resources. Firms with increased organizational resources are more 
likely to engage in essential activities like R&D (Cyert, March 1963). For instance, 
R&D investments generally push firms to explore the unknown that may or may not 
result in payoff. When payoff comes, it is often slow, thus increasing risk. For instance, 
to look at an extreme case, developing an innovative new drug takes on average 12 
years and 800 million dollars (DiMasi et al. 2003). Only firms with considerable finan-
cial slack and commitment to innovation will take on uncertain multiyear projects with 
opportunity costs and capital investment requirements such as these. Financial slack, 
therefore, offers a safety net that enables these firms to pursue new ideas and projects 
with longer investment horizons and less certain outcomes (Kim et al. 2008). Not only 
does financial slack insulate against cash flow volatility, it also maintains R&D invest-
ment through good times and bad (O’Brien 2003). 
Next, we focus on the impact of human slack on innovation intensity. Both financial and 
human slack differ greatly in their degree of stickiness, which is a function of resource 
divisibility and fungibility (Penrose 1959). Penrose (1959) described ‘stickiness’ as the 
extent to which slack resources can be quickly and opportunistically utilized to fuel 
expansion. More specifically, divisibility relates to how easily the amount of a given 
resource can be adjusted to the demands of a situation, while fungibility pertains to 
whether a given resource can be applied to multiple ends interchangeably. Therefore, 
‘stickier’ resources are harder to manage than more liquid resources because they cannot 
be allocated in unit amounts that match the demands of the situation (e.g., a machine 
could have a greater minimum capacity than a firm’s current needs) (Mishina et al. 
2004). Another important point is that once such resources are assigned to a specific 
task, they may or may not be adaptable to new or changed tasks (Mishina et al. 2004). 
For instance, if market demands shift, a machinist will find it hard to suddenly become 
a plumber.
As mentioned earlier, human slack is context driven and is more tied to the nature of 
organizational routines than is the value of financial resources. This is simply because 
human knowledge and skills tend to be embedded in specific tasks and organizational 
contexts (Knorr-Cetina 1999). Task expertise is also limited to narrow knowledge do-
mains (Chi et al. 1988), and thus, this expertise is more difficult to transfer across situ-
ations (Szulanski 2003) than more generic financial resources. Thus, slack in these two 
resources is differently useful to firms pursuing distinct innovation investment strate-
gies. We therefore argue that for these ‘stickier’ human resources, the influence of slack 
on the commitment to R&D is dependent, at least in part, on both the path-dependent 
and firm specific nature (Arthur 1989; David 1985) of human resources. This could be 
extremely beneficial to a firm if, for example, competitors are unable to obtain similar 
resource configurations and may thus have difficulty copying the firm’s strategies (Bar-
ney 1991). This pool of human resources might be useful if a firm needs to intensify 
its R&D efforts given their ability to draw on and reposition resources to support cur-
rent initiatives. Thus, firms with more human resources should be better able to apply 
needed resources to a specific project, keep these resources involved and focused on 
an R&D initiative to fruition. The commitment to R&D may be the force behind some 
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of history’s greatest firm inventions and successes. Take for instance Google’s decision 
to allow engineers to spend 10% of their time on projects of their choosing. Managers 
at Google believe that some of the best innovations come from unstructured work time 
(e.g., Gmail). It is difficult to see how structured environments can constantly perform 
and innovate without slack. The availability of excess resources seems key, especially 
when it comes to innovation. Thus, our arguments here boil down to the idea that 
organizational slack (i.e., both financial and human) permits firms to divert their atten-
tion from “fire fighting” and focus on expansive thinking and risky, innovative projects 
with potentially high payoffs (Nohria, Gulati 1996). Taking all of this together, we thus 
hypothesize:
H1a: Financial slack will positively relate to firm innovation intensity.
H1b: Human slack will positively relate to firm innovation intensity.
1.2. CEO tenure and the slack-innovation relationship 
Here we focus on the impact of CEO tenure on the slack-innovation relationship because 
tenure has been proposed as an important influence on strategic investment (Hambrick, 
Mason 1984). The key question here is, how does a CEO’s time in office affect the 
slack-innovation relationship? Wu et al. (2005) argued that CEO behavior in assigning, 
organizing, and stirring firm resources can significantly affect a firm’s inventive capabil-
ity. We extend this argument by suggesting that CEO behaviors contribute substantially 
to an organization’s commitment to innovation through investment in R&D. CEOs with 
more tenure are probably better performers—because they have lasted so long (Allgood, 
Farrell 2000). Tenure could be positively correlated, therefore, with managerial talent 
and quality (Berger et al. 1997). Such skill, quality, and experience make them gener-
ally better and more sophisticated managers of excess financial and human resources. 
It takes time for a CEO to fully understand the types of resources possessed by the firm 
and to understand how to bundle such resources to achieve and sustain competitive 
advantage. Thus, for a CEO to accurately and fully fund important initiatives, he or she 
must look beyond the financial statements that are traditionally used by top managers. 
The same applies to human resources and their specialized knowledge which is es-
sential in creating competitive advantage (Barney 1991). Competitive markets promote 
concentrated efforts to retain and protect these skilled and specialized employees, and 
therefore, by reducing the ease with which such employees can be acquired, these com-
petitive efforts increase the rarity of human slack resources (Voss et al. 2008).
Further, continuous investment in R&D requires dedication to the firm’s long term ob-
jectives and a deep understanding of how innovation works and how long it can take. 
Short term focus (e.g. worrying about quarterly results) can be characteristic of newly 
hired CEOs, and may limit innovation. Newly hired CEOs may feel that excess capital 
is better spent adding value to the bottom line by growing the sales and marketing de-
partments’ budgets, expanding to new markets, or acquiring other firms. A new CEO 
must ensure early success in a number of categories (building internal and external 
networks, solidifying and expanding their power, developing knowledge specific to their 
firms and industries, and showing preliminary success to shareholders) before they can 
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worry about innovation (Wu et al. 2005). Given the risky nature of R&D, it also seems 
reasonable to suggest that newer CEOs will be hesitant to make large cash investments 
in innovative projects where a payoff may never materialize. On the other hand, some 
research (Berger et al. 1997) has argued that CEOs with longer tenures and better com-
pensation are more entrenched and thus less likely to invest in risky projects. We side 
with and extend the work of Guay (1999), who argued that CEOs with higher total cash 
compensation are better diversified – they have more capital that is invested outside 
their firm – and are therefore less risk averse. Therefore, CEOs with longer tenures seem 
to not only have a better understanding of the firm’s resources and capabilities, but also 
the wisdom to continuously invest in R&D projects that might materialize down the 
road. Thus, we hypothesize:
H2a: CEO tenure positively moderates the financial slack-innovation intensity relation-
ship. 
H2b: CEO tenure positively moderates the human slack-innovation intensity relation-
ship. 
1.3. CEO compensation and the slack-innovation relationship 
Generally, organizations can take both short- and long-term approaches to innovation 
(Leonard-Barton 1995), for instance, through a combination of incremental, cumula-
tive, and radical innovations that are generally intertwined (Saviotti, Mani 1998). With 
suitable compensation for both short- and long-term innovations, a CEO should be 
motivated to manage the flow of products through a firm’s innovation pipeline into the 
market (Balkin et al. 2000). It is important to reiterate that investments in innovation 
are inherently risky (Baysinger et al. 1991). Focusing on innovation implies greater 
variability of outcomes and a greater probability of failure (Balkin et al. 2000).Thus, 
CEOs who are willing to use these excess resources to invest in R&D must and should 
receive higher total compensation in return for bearing greater risk (Finkelstein, Ham-
brick 1996). This is especially true given that these CEOs risk a negative reputation in 
the market if such pricey investments fail to provide the desired results (Balkin et al. 
2000). It is difficult for outsiders to distinguish unfortunate circumstances from poor 
decisions (Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia 1998). For instance, research has revealed that nega-
tive information carries more weight than positive information (Edder, Ferris 1989).
We build on these arguments by suggesting that proper compensation will motivate 
CEOs to channel firm resources (financial and human) towards innovative short- and 
long-term projects in hopes of gaining and sustaining competitive advantage. Executive 
compensation should increase accordingly (Balkin et al. 2000) both because the board 
will likely recognize the multitude of decisions required in such situations, and because 
the board understands the importance of attracting and retaining superior managers 
over ‘bad’ managers (Hambrick, Finkelstein 1987). Chief executives with higher total 
cash compensation have more diversified investments and therefore are more likely to 
invest in riskier projects (Guay 1999). In addition, firms themselves “appear to provide 
managers with incentives to invest in risky projects when the potential loss from forgo-
ing valuable risk-increasing projects is greatest” (Guay 1999: 45). Finally, wealthier 
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individuals generally invest in riskier and longer-term projects simply because they can 
afford to risk more (Frank 2007). Building on these arguments, we suggest that CEOs 
with higher total compensation will be better motivated to manage and bundle firm 
resources (financial and human) to ensure continuity and intensity in the commitment 
to innovation. Therefore we propose:
H3a: Total CEO compensation positively moderates the financial slack-innovation in-
tensity relationship.




Our universe of firms consists of all publicly traded US firms on the NYSE, AMEX, 
and Nasdaq in the ExecuComp database from 1993 to 2011. We excluded financial 
services and utility firms (SIC codes 6000 – 6999 and 4900 – 4999). For all accounting 
variables we relied on Compustat database while we obtained stock returns data from 
CRSP. We excluded firms with incomplete Compustat asset, sales, or R&D data. We 
specifically obtained CEO compensation and tenure data from Execucomp database. For 
one of the control variables, G-index, we used Riskmetrics dataset1. We merged CRSP 
with Compustat using the variable cusip. We matched firms from this merged CRSP 
Compustat database with firms from Execucomp database using the variable gvkey. 
Then we merged the combined dataset with the Riskmetrics dataset using the variable 
cnum2. Our final sample consists of 7,729 firm years.
2.2. Measures
Firm innovation intensity, the dependent variable was measured by the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to total assets3.
Two variables, financial and human slack, were used to measure organizational slack. 
Financial slack is measured as cash + short term investments + 0.7 (total receivables) + 
0.5 (total inventory) – longterm debt due in one year divided by PP&E (Cleary 1999). 
Positive financial slack implies that cash and other current assets are being maintained 
at a higher level than necessary. Negative financial slack, on the other hand, implies 
that a firm is stretching its resources further than expected (Mishina et al. 2004). Human 
slack, was calculated as (firm employees/firm sales – industry employees/industry sales) 
(Mishina et al. 2004). Positive human slack indicates that the firm has more human re-
sources at its disposal than its industry peers which can be allocated toward innovation. 
1 G-Index is a composite index of corporate governance developed by Gompers et al. (2003) and used 
in several leading papers in Finance (e.g., Cremers, Nair 2005).
2 All four databases – CRSP, Compustat, Execuomp, and Riskmetrics – could be accessed through 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) from the University of Pennsylvania.
3 Variables used in our analysis will be denoted in italics hereafter in the main text of the paper.
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Negative human slack implies that managers are constrained in terms of human capital 
and cannot afford to allocate human capital towards innovation. Industry is defined by 
the three digit SIC code, also found in Compustat.
Two moderators were used. The first, tenure, was measured as the number of years an 
individual had been the CEO of a given firm (current year – year CEO took office) (Hill, 
Phan 1991).The second, total compensation, measured as the sum of salary, bonus, other 
annual compensation, restricted stock grants, long term payouts, all other compensa-
tions, and the value of option grants (Chhaochharia, Grinstein 2009).
2.3. Control variables
We controlled for firm age (current year – year the firm went public) and firm size (total 
firm assets, in millions of dollars). Larger and older firms should have more resources to 
allocate to innovation (Cohen, Klepper 1996; Hansen 1992). We controlled for leverage 
(the sum of long term debt and short term debt divided by total assets) (Singh, Faircloth 
2005), profitability (the sum of income, before extraordinary income, and depreciation 
scaled by total assets) (Audretsch 1995), Tobin’s q – growth opportunities (the ratio of 
the market value of assets to the book value of assets) (Szewczyk et al. 1996), stock 
returns volatility (volatility of the past year’s daily stock returns) (Mazzucato, Tancioni 
2012; Core, Guay 1999), G-Index – a corporate governance variable (Hermalin, Weis-
bach 1998) and managerial ownership (percentage of ownership) (Francis, Smith 1995). 
3. Methods of analysis
We employed panel regression and included firm fixed effects to incorporate any omit-
ted and unobserved firm specific factors, year fixed effects to control for macroeconomic 
conditions which may affect R&D and differ across sample years, and industry fixed 
effects to account for any omitted industry specific factors which may be driving the 
results. We used Newey West standard errors while measuring the t statistics to control 
for the possibility of heteroskedasticity in the error terms. 
4. Results
In panel A of Table 1, we report the descriptive statistics of our dependent and inde-
pendent variables. The correlation coefficients between all of our variables are shown 
in panel B Table 1. None of the correlation coefficients are large enough to indicate 
multicollinearity4.
4 We estimate the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all of our regression analyses and find that 
none of them are greater than 3, indicating that our models (as reported in Table 2) do not have the 
problem of multicollinearity. We do not report the VIFs of our regression analysis; they are available 
upon request. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix




r&d/asset 0.055 0.029 0.075 0.007 0.078 3.782
Slack       
financial slack 2.761 1.128 8.220 0.478 2.495 17.695
human slack 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.006 36.525
CEO level variables      
tenure 6.301 4.000 6.834 2.000 9.000 1.829
total compensation  
(in 000s)
5615.073 3321.077 10507.427 1706.042 6568.689 25.652
percentage of 
ownership
1.426 0.250 4.072 0.083 0.823 7.674
 Control variables
asset 7053.990 1750.428 19178.753 661.894 5384.810 8.182
profitability 0.089 0.100 0.118 0.062 0.140 –5.673
leverage 0.224 0.216 0.166 0.098 0.325 0.951
tobin q 1.654 1.264 1.406 0.892 1.922 6.192
log(volatility) 0.089 0.062 0.133 0.037 0.109 36.917
firm age 29.522 28.000 16.375 14.000 44.000 0.209
gindex 8.934 9.000 2.834 7.000 11.000 –0.004







leverage –0.152 –0.173 1.000
tobinq 0.380 0.198 –0.210 1.000
volatility 0.169 –0.164 –0.073 0.047 1.000
asset –0.080 0.052 0.048 –0.046 –0.106 1.000
firm age –0.228 0.073 0.128 –0.159 –0.204 0.259 1.000
financial 
slack
0.318 –0.121 –0.041 0.041 0.109 –0.052 –0.093 1.000
human 
slack
0.039 –0.102 –0.012 0.042 0.010 –0.079 –0.087 –0.067 1.000
gindex –0.194 0.037 0.146 –0.125 –0.138 0.025 0.368 –0.078 –0.025 1.000
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Table 2. Regression of firm innovation intensity on lag firm innovation intensity,  
financial slack, human slack, total compensation and tenure5

















































































































































5 Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effect, year fixed effect, and industry fixed effect (2 digit 
SIC code). Standard errors are in parenthesis.




–0.036 0.021 –0.033 –0.006 0.045 –0.092 –0.194 0.050 0.049 –0.140 1.000
total com-
pensation
0.024 0.053 –0.003 0.110 –0.025 0.272 0.113 0.013 –0.060 0.026 –0.049 1.000
tenure 0.040 0.032 –0.044 0.029 0.000 –0.045 –0.097 0.014 0.001 –0.108 0.330 –0.005 1.000
Notes: p < 0.05 for r > 0.024 and p < 0.01 for r > 0.031.
End of Table 1
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firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
year effect yes yes yes yes yes
industry fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
N 7729 5522 5522 5522 5522
R2 0.303 0.307 0.313 0.312 0.316
Adjusted R2 0.300 0.303 0.308 0.308 0.311
Change in R2  0.004 0.006 0.006 0.009
F stat  2.038 2.895 2.795 4.146
p value  0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In Table 2, we report the results of the regression analysis. The number of observations 
drops from 7729 to 5522 due to missing observations (mainly because of the variable 
emp from Execucomp which was not populated for all firm years). The coefficient on 
financial slack is positive and significant, in support of hypothesis 1a (column 2). Firms 
with greater financial slack are able to allocate more resources to risky projects through 
increased R&D investment. However, even though the coefficient on human slack is 
positive, it is insignificant and does not support hypothesis 1b. In column 3, we report 
End of Table 2
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the results for Model 3 which includes the interactions of tenure with financial slack 
and tenure with human slack. The coefficient of tenure with financial slack is positive 
(0.055) and significant, lending support to hypothesis 2a. Managers with higher levels of 
tenure allocate more financial resources to R&D investments. The coefficient of tenure 
with human slack is positive (0.073) and significant, in support of hypothesis 2b. More 
tenured managers put greater human resources into risky investments such as R&D. 
In column 4, we document the regression estimates for Model 4. Model 4 includes the 
interactions of total compensation with financial slack and human slack. The coefficient 
of total compensation with financial slack is positive (0.047) and significant, support-
ing hypothesis 3a. Managers with greater total compensation allocate more financial 
resources to innovation. Further, the coefficient of the interaction of total compensa-
tion with human slack is also positive, supporting hypothesis 3b. Managers with higher 
levels of compensation direct more human resources towards R&D. 
In column 5, we report the results of Model 5, which includes the interactions of tenure 
with financial slack and human slack, and the interactions of total compensation with 
financial slack and human slack. All four coefficients of the four interaction terms are 
positive and significant, in support of hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b. The coefficient of 
financial slack is also positive and significant, supporting hypothesis 1a. Overall, the 
results reported in columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 support our hypothesis 1a, 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b. 
5. Discussions
Our results confirm our original supposition that both financial and human slack impact 
firm R&D spending and that both CEO tenure and CEO compensation are important in 
securing the funding and people needed to initiate and complete R&D projects. These 
outcomes clearly show that CEOs with longer tenure are more willing to risk R&D ini-
tiatives and that proper and thoughtful compensation packages could strongly motivate 
CEOs to pay more attention to the innovation process. 
This work contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we analyze the slack-
innovation relationship. We specifically focus on the relationship between financial and 
human slack and their impact on R&D investment which surprisingly has received little 
or no attention especially given that such R&D related allocation decisions are one of 
most fundamental decisions made by top managers (Barker, Mueller 2002). Thus, we 
extend the work of Nohria and Gulati (1996) by using objective measures for both inde-
pendent and dependent variables, and also answering calls to use firm-level panel data to 
gain deeper insights into the slack-innovation relationship, increasing the relevance and 
importance of the work. The sample extends from 1993 to 2011 and contains 7729 firm-
years, making the results strong, robust, and generalizable. Second, this study focuses 
on the combination of CEO tenure and compensation and their impact on the slack-
innovation relationship, therefore making it the first study to our knowledge to report 
how CEO tenure and CEO compensation moderates the slack-innovation relationship. 
Third, we draw on a number of theories such as RBV and upper echelons to enhance our 
understanding of these relationships. Fourth, this study moves away from the traditional 
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emphasis only on financial slack by considering a different type of organizational slack 
(i.e., human slack) that has not been studied as often in the literature, thereby enhancing 
our understanding of its influence. 
Key implications of this work directly impact managers, investors, and board mem-
bers. For example, we hope that our results encourage these leaders to think carefully 
about the various characteristics of the CEO (e.g., tenure) and about the details of the 
compensation package they offer. Without a doubt, slack resources matter. But more 
insights and studies are needed to fully understand how to best manage slack resources 
without wasting them. For instance, although beyond the scope of this paper, the law 
of diminishing returns might kick in at a certain point thus reducing the impact of each 
additional resource on firm innovation levels6. Further, testing our results with a sample 
of small firms, or in different international settings, might prove useful as well. Smaller 
firms might find it difficult to maintain the levels of slack needed for considerable R&D 
investments and resource allocation decisions might become even more complex. Look-
ing further into international firms, especially those in developing countries might be 
necessary given the essential role of innovation in attaining and sustaining competitive 
advantage in developing countries where industrial growth has become integral to eco-
nomic development (Ooi et al. 2012). Firms in developing countries in hypercompeti-
tive global environments that seek long-term success are increasingly focusing on inno-
vation and shifting away from cost reduction efforts. Therefore, a better understanding 
of how managers make resource allocation decisions in such environments might differ 
from research that focused on samples from western countries (e.g., Voss et al. 2008). 
Conclusions
This study contributes to the understanding of the complex links between organizational 
slack, CEO tenure, CEO compensation, and R&D investments. Our findings point to the 
importance of both financial and human slack for firms’ ability to innovate. Our results 
also show that our grasp of the slack-innovation relationship is not complete without 
studying CEO tenure and compensation. 
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